vuln-fix: Partial Path Traversal Vulnerability

This fixes a partial path traversal vulnerability.

Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.

To demonstrate this vulnerability, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.

Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: Medium
CVSSS: 6.1
Detection: CodeQL & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.PartialPathTraversalVulnerability)

Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>

Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#13

Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>

Author: JLLeitschuh

src/main/java/com/github/jlangch/venice/impl/util/io/LoadPaths.java

@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ private boolean isFileWithinDirectory(
         if (dir_.isDirectory()) {
             final File fl = new File(dir_, file.getPath());
             if (fl.isFile()) {
-                if (fl.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(dir_.getCanonicalPath())) {
+                if (fl.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(dir_.getCanonicalFile().toPath())) {
                     // Prevent accessing files outside the load-path.
                     // E.g.: ../../coffee
                     return true;